The beginning of the year of 2025 has seen the stalling of the momentum gained by the Arakan Army and its allies from Operation 1027. While the Tatmadaw had been decisively defeated in Arakan and the surrounding regions, they still continue to hold out in the urban areas of Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and the island of Munaung. Expelling them from these areas has been difficult to achieve due to the fact that these areas are accessible by sea, allowing for easy resupply of entrenched forces by Tatmadaw naval units. In response, the Arakan Army and its allies have been unable to enforce an effective blockade to choke supplies out since the beginning of Operation 1027.
Sittwe and Kyaukphyu are the largest urban centers of the state, with Sittwe standing as the state capital. The Arakan Army (AA) and the United League of Arakan (ULA) party leading it may only be able to claim solid legitimacy as its rulers only in the event of a full capture of these two cities.
Being unable to achieve it for so long has disadvantaged the AA/ULA, particularly in regards to Chinese involvement. The announcement of a ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA) had placed significant political pressure on the Arakan Army, as the TNLA was a key partner with whom Operation 1027 was launched.
At the same time, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and its partner militant groups have continued scattered hit-and-run attacks against ethnic Arakanese civilians and isolated Arakan Army outposts. These attacks have reached as far as Rathedaung, marking a significant extension of their range from just the Bangladesh-Myanmar border region. It must be noted that accusations of ethnic cleansing and forced labor by the Arakan Army targeting the remaining Rohingya populace have been made, culminating in a report by independent NGO Fortify Rights published on the 22nd of October. The report details human rights abuses such as the aforementioned forced labor and forced military recruitment occurring from 2024 to mid-2025, but notable instances from October 2025 could not be verified. [Fortify Rights]
This OSINT report explores events occurring in the state of Arakan throughout the month of October.
A) Battlefield developments
October 2025 has witnessed significant military operations carried out by the Tatmadaw and the Rohingya militant groups against the Arakan Army, all while they advance deeper into the Burmese majority regions of Bago, Irrawaddy, and Mandalay, putting the Tatmadaw on the back foot there. The Tatmadaw signed a ceasefire agreement with the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA) on the 28th October, a move aimed at the Mandalay region People’s Defense Force (PDF), consisting of Burmese rebels, but also to throw off the resolve of the Arakan Army, as it was allied with the TNLA. Simultaneously, the counterattacks were launched against Arakan Army positions stationed on the outskirts of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu.
On the 27th of October, just prior to the formal signing of the ceasefire, Tatmadaw infantry units began to assault entrenched Arakan Army positions under artillery and close air support in a desperate bid to break the frontlines in Kyaukphyu. Shortly thereafter, units holed up in Sittwe also began pushing outwards. The initial wave of attacks forced the AA to make a limited retreat. The use of artillery barrages and airstrikes to attack AA positions has resulted in civilian casualties, with photographic evidence posted by the AA’s information desk along with a tally of the identities of the deceased. [Burma News International, AA Info Desk]
Drones are also being used by the Tatmadaw against advancing Arakan Army positions. In the video attached below, a video feed from a Tatmadaw drone can be seen where it is bombing what appears to be scattered AA fighters. They appear to be unaware of the drone above them and are taken by surprise when the bombs do drop. Such attack patterns are consistent with how drones have been used for anti-personnel actions by both sides of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is not known whether AA troops in the region wield anti-drone countermeasures of any kind.
In the outskirts of Sittwe, it had been reported that some villages had been burnt down by the Tatmadaw on the 29th of October. Reporting on the event, Narinjara News has speculated that the tactical justification for burning the aforementioned villages down was to clear the sightline for deploying drones and to deny Arakan Army troops the use of cover. The Tatmadaw – Lay, or the Myanmar Air Force, has continued to launch airstrikes in coastal areas, attempting to strike entrenched AA positions and supply columns all the way up till the 31st of October. Indeed, these airstrikes have continued to result in civilian deaths and injuries.
Motivations for attempting this breakout against the Arakan Army surround the fact that they are left to garrison a total area of almost 37,000 square kilometers with only 40,000 personnel. Furthermore, forces are also committed to making advances into Central Myanmar in cooperation with Burmese PDF rebels and other ethnic separatist militant groups. Al Jazeera reported in August 2025 that Kyaukphyu is besieged by an AA force that is 10,000 strong. [Al Jazeera]
Tatmadaw forces holed up in either Sittwe or Kyaukphyu are generally understood to be much weaker in numerical strength, amounting to a few to several battalions in either location. These units have been besieged there since being pushed back through the events of Operation 1027, but remain battle-hardened and determined to carry out central command orders transmitted from Naypyidaw.
Control of the Munaung island and the Arakan Army’s lack of offensive naval and anti-aircraft capabilities ensures that supply lines to besieged Tatmadaw units remain intact. While the besieging force remains numerically strong, Tatmadaw airstrikes can threaten to disrupt and scatter defensive formations, particularly if they are carried out in coordination with infantry assaults. The Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) however, is overstretched with its limited resources, especially jet fuel. The force has to operate on both western and eastern ends of Myanmar. Therefore, constant close air support may not be a guarantee for besieged Tatmadaw-Kyi (Army) infantry units. [ReliefWeb]
More recent reports from Arakanese news outlets, including Narinjara, suggest that the Tatmadaw are experiencing heavy casualties trying to break through, with entrenched AA positions managing to hold them off. Sittwe and Kyaukphyu thus remain as the active battle zones inside Arakan for the foreseeable future, while AA troops continue steadily advancing through the Bago region from which Tatmadaw troops in Arakan are completely isolated. [The Irrawaddy]
It is not just the Tatmadaw who are overstretched, however. On the Western front for the Arakan Army, combat is characterized by counter-insurgency and anti-guerilla operations against the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM), and the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA).
These militant groups, primarily ARSA, have continued their highly mobile raiding operations against the Arakan Army. The terrain of the Bangladesh-Myanmar border area and the rest of Arakan in general is composed of heavily vegetated areas in combination with high elevation in the north, closer to Bandarban and undulating terrain closer to Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Such terrain is naturally difficult to traverse and operate on, owing to limited or low-quality road infrastructure, favoring irregular warfare tactics.
Thus, ARSA militants have been conducting hit-and-run attacks, attempting to ambush separated Arakan Army patrols wherever they may find them in order to capture their equipment. They have also attempted to capture permanent AA outposts near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, though with mixed results.
Until October, the range of ARSA operations extended up to the borders of Maungdaw Township and small swathes of land area extending from the Bandarban side. 22nd October saw the ARSA extending their reach into Rathedaung, thereby crossing overland from Maungdaw Township. The attack in Rathedaung, as alleged by the Arakan Army and Arakanese news outlets, ended in the killing of ethnic Arakanese civilians, a family unit to be precise.
Rathedaung falls inside the core regions of AA control, and it must be seen whether or not the Arakan Army launches military operations in the region to root out ARSA units. Such a move could also result in allegations of human rights abuses against ethnic Rohingya civilians, as the Arakan Army was previously accused of doing in 2024 and even prior to that, alongside the Tatmadaw. ARSA and the RSO have seen rapid rises in terms of firepower over the course of 2024 to 2025. They have also adopted what appears to be standardized camouflage patterns over the years, becoming a far cry from the ragged bandits operating on a shoestring budget that they once were.
The image above shows ARSA fighters clad in local clothing without any body armor or chest rigs. Such a loadout has had them identified as something more akin to a group of bandits rather than any serious military force able to stand up to the Tatmadaw or the Arakan Army. Their armaments consisted of whatever could be recovered from central government Border Guard Police (BGP) or Tatmadaw-Kyi patrols that they managed to ambush. These were Burmese MA-1s and BA-63 copies of the Galil and G3, respectively.
Its previous rivalries with other militia groups, such as the RSO and ARA, tended to be over trafficking rights. It appears that these differences were smoothed over, at least temporarily, through the formation of the ‘Four Brotherhood Alliance’ between the ARSA, RSO, ARA, and RIM. The decision to form the alliance was taken in 2024 on the eve of the fall of Maungdaw to the Arakan Army in their campaign against Tatmadaw forces. The ARSA and RSO in particular have been at work upgrading their arsenal since at least 2021, but have rapidly made advances starting from 2024. The images below show RSO and ARSA fighters, respectively, sporting ballistic helmets, communication equipment, full uniform kits, and heavier small arms.
Since the formation of the alliance, ARSA has consistently stood out as the most heavily armed and cohesive of the groups. They are being seen with AK-pattern rifles more frequently, indicating that they have made strides in not relying on captured battlefield loot for weapons.
More importantly for October 2025, however, is the fact that the ARSA was able to hold a large commemorative event allegedly inside Arakan on the 26th, which was widely posted on social media, apparently without OPSEC concerns. ‘9th October Day’ marks for ARSA its baptism of fire, through which it established itself as a credible threat to the Tatmadaw. It must be noted that the attacks carried out by ARSA provided the justification cited by the Tatmadaw in their ethnic cleansing campaign of Rohingyas, leading to the 2017 exodus into Bangladesh.
The event culminated in a speech in the Burmese language, which essentially tried to communicate that the ARSA only targets military units and emphatically denies any involvement in the deaths of ethnic Arakanese civilians. Yet, pro-Rohingya social media activity tells a different story, with attempts to claim recent civilian deaths as military personnel deaths in reality. Such accounts also sometimes share GoPro clips of Rohingya militants engaging in these actions, firing at what clearly appear to be civilian vehicles. Being in violation of social media content guidelines, they are taken down shortly afterwards.
B) Civilian deaths
Military operations in Myanmar have had mass casualty events of civilians as an unfortunately common aspect. This is due to the fact that terror bombings and raids against them have become an accepted warfighting convention over the last eight decades of conflict in the country. [The New York Times]
Therefore, the Tatmadaw, for example, does not hesitate to carry out airstrikes that end up killing and injuring mostly civilians. These actions seem to suggest that civilians belonging to rebel factions are valid military targets, and ethnic Burmese rebel territories have not been spared from this either. Intermittent terror bombing strikes had been conducted over the last year, targeting Arakanese settlements much in the same way that airstrikes on ethnic Burmese civilians in rebel-held territories in central Myanmar have been carried out.
More recent civilian casualties along the lines of contact in Kyaukphyu and Sittwe have been noted during the increase in the pace of fighting, as AA positions are holed up inside civilian settlements. Many of these casualties have also resulted from artillery strikes, indiscriminately cutting down civilians caught in the battlespace.
By virtue of having sources close to the battlefield, Narinjara also reported that the besieged Tatmadaw-Kyi units within Sittwe have been making arrests of civilians. It could be assumed that these arrests are being undertaken under suspicion of subterfuge or spying. Interestingly, the report by Narinjara also alleges that detainees are being offered bail for sums ranging from 500,000 to 2,000,000 Myanmar kyats, roughly translating to 230 to 950 USD paid to military officials. What this might communicate as to the absolute state of the besieged Tatmadaw units is anything but a ‘green flag’. [Narinjara, 31st October]
One may expect such arbitrary detentions and what may also effectively be called the ransoming of Arakanese civilians to continue as battlefield conditions gradually become more and more untenable for the Tatmadaw, as they fail to break through Arakan Army defenses. The situation hinges on aerial units being able to launch precise bomb strikes on those defense, and this capability is currently limited due to priority engagements against the Karen National Liberation Front (KNLF) on the eastern front.
The Tatmadaw-Lay (Air Force) employs a combination of JF-17s, MiG-29s, JL-9s, and CH-3 combat drones to launch airstrikes amid a constant shortage of jet fuel and munitions supplies due to sanctions. Their deployments are intermittent and overstretched across the width of their national battlespace against many ethnic separatist groups and Burmese PDF rebels.
Right: JL-9 with a different tail number at a Tatmadaw – Lay airbase. Source: Collected
Turning to the Rohingya militant groups, consistent accusations and reports of their engaging in the killing of ethnic Arakanese civilians have been consistent even since the 2010s. Arakanese news outlets and AA sources have continued to support their accusations against the Rohingya militant groups using photographic evidence and named lists of individuals killed.
As mentioned previously in this report itself, some of these incidents can sometimes be corroborated through the posts of pro-Rohingya militant group accounts that post combat by ARSA/RSO fighters recording footage using GoPro setups. Suffice to say, not all of their targets seem to be armed Arakan Army fighters. Pro-Rohingya militant group social media accounts have made claims and posted videos conflicting with the official statements by ARSA or RSO.
Indeed, the animus from the events of the 2010s leading to the 2017 exodus of Rohingyas into Bangladesh has a history of taking on such a dimension, and it remains a fact that between the Arakan Army, Tatmadaw, and the Rohingya militant groups, they are all divided along ethnic lines.
The Rohingya militant groups are advancing with the express purpose of establishing a Rohingya majority statelet comprising the Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, and it would be logical for ethnic Arakanese living in those places to not be trusting of any of the Rohingya groups at all.
At face value, it appears that the motivation for targeting ethnic Arakanese civilians is to extract revenge for similar abuses by the Arakan Army in 2024 and carrying them out simply as part of the way of warfare in Myanmar. What else they plan to achieve out of this may be found where the long-term reaction of Rohingya refugees and other civilians to these actions head towards.
C) Operational outlook for the next several months
It would seem that the state of the war in Arakan is beginning to enter a flashpoint that may rear its head within the next couple of months. This appears to be primarily hinging on the state of the Tatmadaw’s advance and the integrity of their frontlines following their attempts at a breakout. On the other hand, ARSA’s guerilla operations are beginning to cause too much of a headache for the Arakan Army in regards to the United League of Arakan’s attempts at putting up a legitimate front as a government. The pressure is on to prove to its support base that it can handle the threat and protect citizens from harm. These will shape the factions’ plans for November and ahead. The operational outlook for each faction is broken down as such:
i) Arakan Army:
- Shatter the breakout attempts of the Tatmadaw at Sittwe and Kyaukphyu by inflicting catastrophic casualties.
- Weather the terror bombing campaign while also making steady advances deep into central Myanmar to cut away at the Tatmadaw central government’s morale.
- Encourage the Burmese rebel People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to reorganize and engage Tatmadaw units on their own.
- Continue to attempt to delegitimize the ARSA’s proclaimed political mandate until the time for a sustained military response is clear.
ii) Rohingya militant groups:
- Consolidate its political mandate amongst Rohingya supporters in the camps and in northern Arakan through successful ambushes and raids on Arakan Army positions/units.
- Continue global political outreach and social media narrative-building.
- Prepare for a sustained military response from the Arakan Army while attempting to make successful terror strikes deep into Arakan.
iii) Tatmadaw:
- Inflict heavy casualties on the Arakan Army in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu with the coordination of effective close air support.
- Blunt Arakan Army advances into central Myanmar to attempt to grind their offensive actions to a halt.
- Prevent the United League of Arakan from being able to consolidate its image as a political force capable of protecting Arakanese civilians.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated from factional information desks, social media accounts, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.