Simultaneous pitched battles rage on in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu as besieged Tatmadaw units attempt to mount a breakout with air and naval fire support on their side. Their Arakan Army opponents continue to gradually tighten the noose, making the Tatmadaw pay for every offensive action as much as possible. Attrition continues to take its toll on their cohesion, but the blockade is kept from being fully effective due to the open naval supply lines held down by the Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy). Putting their battle-hardened experience to effective use, AA troops have inflicted serious casualties on Tatmadaw troops, with one notable instance involving an accurate drone strike and another involving a killzone trap.
At the same time, the Tatmadaw – Lay (Air Force) continues its signature terror strikes against civilians, attempting to demoralize the Arakan Army’s support base. The State Administration Council (SAC) junta seeks to exploit what can potentially be presented as a fratricidal war being unjustly pursued by the Arakan Army/United League of Arakan leadership. AA leadership are not sitting by idly, with AA units opening up a new front in the Ayeyarwady region of Burma proper, i.e. central Myanmar. This was on top of pre-existing offensives in the Bago and Magway regions of central Myanmar targeting Tatmadaw munitions and supply factories.
The pressure exerted upon the Arakan Army is significant in part due to delays in the capture of Sittwe and Kyauphyu. Without a full capture of both cities, it will be impossible for control to be consolidated under the United League of Arakan, so that a favorable position on the negotiating table with the SAC junta and China can be gained. Indeed, Chinese pressure for ceasefires has been heavy, particularly after Arakan Army’s allies, the Taung National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA,) both signed ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw.
India has also joined China in its endorsement of the SAC junta’s planned elections, which have been criticized as being controlled, sham elections. Considering the fact that both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu are prime strategic real estate offering access to both the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Strait, there can be no doubt that certain interests wish for the Arakan Army to face defeat. For the time being, the most visible international support has been thrown behind the Tatmadaw.
Rohingya militant group activity within northern Arakan has been limited for the month, apart from one key movement that could be noted from the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). As of the time of writing in the first week of December, a raiding party of the RSO attacked a small Arakan Army outpost on the 2nd of December. As for the Rohingya Islami Mahaz, a heavily armed squad travelling by boat through a small canal can be seen in a video posted as early as 24th November. Such canals, where forces hostile to the Arakan Army can operate, are located deep inside northern Arakan, close to the Bangladeshi border, adjacent to Bandarban.
A) Battlefield developments
The first week of November began with the continuation of firefights and probing assaults supported by artillery that characterized the escalation of military confrontations starting from 27th October. This was very soon after the signing of the ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and the TNLA. Arakanese news outlet Development Media Group reported on the 5th of November that the Tatmadaw launched an offensive against Arakan Army positions holed up in the village of Thaing Chaung. They had forced Arakan Army units stationed in the village of Zin Chaung, which was the previous lynchpin of the siege against Tatmadaw units holed up in Kyaukphyu.
On the 10th of November, Tatmadaw units were able to push Arakan Army units out of the village of Thaing Chaung, which houses a landmark monastery. This was after two days of heavy fighting contesting the village. Uneven terrain south of Thaing Chaung was firmly in the control of the Arakan Army, preventing those Tatmadaw units from being able to consolidate their gains. At the same time, the advance towards Thaing Chaung cost the Tatmadaw dearly, with reports suggesting that a 200-strong assault detachment was battered to its breaking point.
With a view to scoring a decisive victory against locally-deployed Arakan Army units, a sizeable Tatmadaw detachment was sent to mount an offensive towards the village of Minbyin. This village is the site of the Kyaukphyu Meteorological Radar Station, which is a key landmark for the entirety of Ramree Island, and offers elevated terrain beneficial not only for guarding Minbyin village itself, but also to serve as a platform for accurate artillery barrages southwards into Arakan Army positions. Their advance to the radar station and Minbyin villages was supported by consistent artillery barrages and bombardment from naval assets. Capture of Minbyin and the Kyaukphyu Meteorological Radar Station would have relieved pressure off of Tatmadaw units mounting an uphill assault on Thaing Chaung.
There is a high likelihood that the Western Naval Command’s premier frigates UMS Kyansitthe and UMS Aung Zeya are engaged in bombardments. Littoral Arakan is ideal for the vessels’ deployment using its 76 mm guns capable of firing high explosive (HE) rounds. Despite the fact that details about specific vessels are scarce, sources such as The Irrawaddy do make sure to mention the fact that naval bombardment is being employed against the Arakan Army.
Kyaukphyu Meteorological Radar Station fell to the Tatmadaw briefly on the 14th of November, and the events that transpired shortly claimed the lives of nearly a whole squad of Tatmadaw – Kyi (Army) troops who were quick to claim victory and pose for photos. As seen from the video recording of an Arakan Army reconnaissance drone, the aforementioned troops were promptly cut down by a large explosion. Narinjara News reports it as a droke strike, in which case the drone capturing the footage could have worked as a spotter feeding location information. [Narinjara]
The event speaks to the inexperience of the unfortunate Tatmadaw troops, and it is known that the Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) has been shipping in fresh troops into Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Elsewhere in Myanmar, accusations against the Tatmadaw of press-ganging teenagers and young adults have come up, with some cases documented by Al Jazeera. Since 2024, troops have been shipped in and out of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu to replace losses and reorganize the formations, leaving little room for doubt as to how inexperienced troops end up in combat against the Arakan Army there.
On the 17th of November, a spirited push for Minbyin was mounted by the Tatmadaw. Arakan Army units defending the village feigned a retreat at first. Based on Irrawaddy’s report, AA troops planted anti-personnel mines before pulling back and setting up a firing line. Once Tatmadaw units entered the locale and set off a mine explosion, the firing line opened up, creating a killzone that caused 30 casualties right away. [Irrawaddy]
Such incidents, along with precise strikes similar to what transpired at the Kyaukphyu Meteorological Radar Station, sapped away the Tatmadaw’s advancing momentum, leading the Arakan Army to recapture the station and Minbyin as a whole by the end of the month. Considering how quickly the AA were able to recapture these strategic points, earlier reports claiming that Tatmadaw units assaulting Thaing Chaung suffered heavy casualties appear validated. Such a quick rout of units from Minbyin despite the advantage in fire support can be explained by the disintegration of units at the strategic point of Thaing Chaung.
The front in Sittwe has remained relatively calm compared to Kyaukphyu, despite bouts of gunfire being scattered between Tatmadaw garrison units and besieging Arakan Army units. Throughout November, the area has seen Tatmadaw air and naval units consistently bombard AA positions as the relatively flatter surface of the Sittwe Peninsula leaves targeted units more vulnerable. Counter-battery fire from AA was also noted, intending to check any probable probing advances from besieged Tatmadaw units. Reports from late November suggest much the same, with the Tatmadaw pulling the trigger against AA units that were staging for an advance.
Mizzima has reported that on the 22nd of November, Tatmadaw – Yay (Navy) transport vessels shipped battalion-sized reinforcements to Sittwe; the number being reported as 500. From the 22nd to the 24th, continuous artillery fire missions commenced, apparently to keep AA units from mounting an assault during a vulnerable period of re-arming and re-organizing. At the same time, the Tatmadaw had been at work arresting dissidents and others whom it had suspected of providing intelligence to the Arakan Army. Mizzima reports 10 arrests in November alone, following similar arrests made in previous months.
What prevented the Sittwe garrison from attempting to break out and make gains towards Ponnagyun in November? The answer has to be the defeat of the Kyaukphyu breakout. The failure to recapture ground past the 30-40 kilometer line down south across Ramree Island meant that the Tatmadaw had been unable to rout AA units enough in a manner that would make a combined push out of Sittwe debilitating for the AA’s strategic operations. It could also be that the reinforcements had not arrived in time to be able to coordinate breakout attempts with Kyaukphyu, and are now left to wait and plan for the upcoming months.
Future Tatmadaw – Kyi actions and attempts at seizing the initiative will be determined in part by the success or failure of Arakan Army units currently engaged in punitive expeditions in central Myanmar.
B) Civilian deaths from airstrikes and artillery bombardments
The previous month’s situation report revealed a pattern of unarmed Arakanese civilians often being targeted for airstrikes. It is known that such actions are a regular feature of the nature of war in Myanmar. Tatmadaw thinking appears to be that the strikes can demoralize civilian support for the Arakan Army, banking on the fact that ethnic Arakanese and ethnic Burmese are closely related peoples with deep roots in the ancient and medieval histories of what forms Myanmar. Pro-SAC junta parties based in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, such as the Arakan Front Party (AFP), the Rakhine Nationalities Party (RNP), and the Mro National Development Party (MNDP), are attempting to present themselves as viable alternatives to the United League of Arakan (ULA).
Their success in this regard ought to be judged negatively as of the time of writing unless the ULA are verifiably accused of gross neglect or human rights abuses of the Arakanese civilian population. Further clarification on the topic can be expected to come about after the December and January elections.
Sorties and artillery fire missions starting from the 6th of November to the 8th constitute the first round of civilian deaths in the state. Several dozen civilian deaths have been reported by Arakanese news outlets during this period. They primarily hold the Tatmadaw – Lay for the casualties, although some were noted to have been from artillery units stationed in Sittwe. From the 12th onwards, further airstrikes in Kyauktaw and Rathedaung may have been intended to hit supply columns. These strikes resulted in a further 20 civilian deaths. [Mizzima]
15th November saw airstrikes hit the small town of Ponnagyun, which is the last major urbanized stop before Sittwe. These may have been intended to hit holed-up Arakan Army troops staging for assaults, but as usual, civilians were killed. On the 17th of November, two small boats left the Sittwe port in an attempt to flee but were shot at and captured by Tatmadaw troops. While reports do not indicate the identities of the people on the boats, one may assume the detention to be related to previous and ongoing instances of civilians being arrested within Sittwe. Trying to leave without permission was likely to have been seen as a potential espionage activity. [Narinjara]
The remainder of the month saw strikes specifically intended to check the advance of AA troops in both Sittwe and Kyaukphyu, with one particular artillery strike on the 26th appearing to be off-mark leading to the injury of a woman. It remains unclear what casualties were inflicting during this end period.
It is important to remember that although ‘punishing’ civilian populations for being in rebel territory is a feature of warfare in Myanmar, it would also not be wise to eliminate the possibility that Arakan Army fighters were intended targets. Indeed, the fighting is village-to-village, with the villages and small towns serving as staging areas, temporary bases, and holdouts.
C) Rohingya militant actions
The month of November has been quiet in terms of verifiable incidents of Rohingya militant groups attacking any sort of target in Arakan. Pro-Arakan Army news outlets such as Global Arakan Network do report attacks on civilians attributed to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) but fail to provide adequate documentation. A particular claim about three villagers, including one young girl allegedly abducted by ARSA, has also been repeated by Narinjara News, again lacking documentation of significance apart from the testimony of one monk.
While not much had come up regarding the ARSA, it is known that on the 12th of November, a former top leader of the RSO and its armed wing, the RDF, passed away due to natural causes. This man is Professor Muhammad Zakaria, who used to be a teacher at the Sittwe College. The statement announcing his death from the London-based Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) mentions Cox’s Bazar as his place of death. It would appear that Prof. Zakaria used to be a key RSO leader in the 1990s and 2000s, and the send-off that he received was that of respect. [ARNO Press Release]
As of the time of writing in December, the RSO/RDF fighters have attacked an Arakan Army outpost in a clustering of hamlets called Kokkodoingya and Muringyajhuri. These appear to be Rohingya language names, which could not be reliably validated with official Arakanese/Burmese names for the hamlets. What can be judged reliably is that the engagement took place somewhere in the hilly regions of northern Arakan. The implications of this attack remain to be seen for the rest of the month.
The month of November has otherwise been quiet on the Rohingya front apart from incidents of crime in Cox Bazar, with one armed abduction being of interest. Apart from the typical incident of gunfire along the border indicating potshots and small skirmishes, nothing significant has occurred in November 2025. The only other point of note appears to be operations of the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM). Its Islamist political program has been gaining popularity with Rohingya youth, and it should be noted that pro-RIM accounts often post captions in Bangla.
Some of these accounts have posted a short of a squadron of fighters on a small motorized boat. Judging from how openly they are moving about in the video and the geomorphology of the surroundings, it would make sense for the video to have been shot in remote northern Arakan. This is where Rohingya militant groups operate with impunity the most, and it is made possible by the fact that road networks to that region are of rather poor quality or entirely non-existent.
Reliable judgements state that the video was taken somewhere along the course of the Purma river, which snakes through almost the entirety of Maungdaw. Huge sections of the river are to be found in remote, hilly and densely forested regions that are difficult to access by any party. Pro-RIM accounts went on to post footage of a harassing attack on a small AA outpost on the 12th of December. The locale shown in the footage appears to be around some mud flats along the banks of the Purma, which have dried up.
RIM appears to have come a long way from its old rocket-launching video, as its fighters now sport military-style camo, more military-grade firearms, and other accessories. The expansion of their support networks in Bangladesh and abroad should be monitored, as they may be poised to overtake the ARA and RSO in the future as a leading political force among Rohingyas.
Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated using factional information desks, social media accounts, geospatial intelligence, documents, and established news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions. Maps and overlays are created using QGIS and Google My Maps.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques. A graduate of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.