Pakistan’s JF-17 fleet is set to continue in its role as a workhorse for the foreseeable future. This joint-venture project between the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) has been iterated upon over the years to slowly build up with a proper 4th generation fighter capable of fighting in the modern battlefield. This process is expected to continue as the Pakistan Air Force will retain its need for a lightweight, low-cost option to serve as its mainstay fighter and multirole platform. But the JF-17 needs to stay updated within the currently ongoing fighter jet arms race.
Truly experimental
AC has come up with an answer to that predicament. The PFX (Pakistan Fighter Experimental) is slated to be the next evolutionary step for the platform so that it could be deployed in the same bracket of effectiveness and mission profile(s) as the J-10C. It was exhibited at the International Defense Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS) held in Karachi from the 19th to 22nd November 2024. Previously, it was announced in a now-removed video commemorating Operation Swift Retort which was launched in 2019 against Indian-administered Kashmir.
Before continuing, it must be mentioned that while the PFX project was announced to be an evolution of the JF-17 platform, more recent mentions of the project tend to exclude any references to the JF-17. PAC has remained very quiet and secretive about the whole project since the first unveiling and the exhibition at IDEAS 2024. For the sake of completion, this article will proceed with the assumption that the PFX will be an evolution of the JF-17.
From what could be gathered from various sources, the PFX is to be an effort for Pakistan to be able to manufacture avionics, radars, and integration modules independently of foreign suppliers as much as possible. An AESA radar is to come with it as a fundamental element whose elements are to be produced within Pakistan. Specifics as to how it would be achieved have not been revealed however. [Janes]
It is to be achieved while developing the platform more sharply into what can be considered a deep strike tactical fighter. How so? The shining sword that PAC wants to equip the PFX with is the PL-17 missile. This is an ultra-long range beyond visual range (BVR) missile intended to threaten long distance targets such as AWACS and tanker aircraft. A range of 400 kilometers is reported by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and this capacity is to be achieved using active and passive sensors contained within the missile itself and presumably through linkages with aircraft data links. [IISS]
As of the time of writing, an equivalent is not yet fielded by the United States until the AIM-260 JATM gets cleared for use following the completion of its development. The 400 kilometer range claim for the PL-17 is not fully verified; it is an estimate at best. Yet, its purpose is clear. Pakistan’s procurement of the PL-17 is quite clearly aimed towards India, whose air force still has a slight numerical disadvantage in AWACS platforms. Evidently, the PAF does not want to wait around for them to close the distance. This disadvantage combined with a seamless data link system is generally accepted to be what caused India its humiliation in May 2025.
As of the time of writing, an equivalent is not yet fielded by the United States until the AIM-260 JATM gets cleared for use following the completion of its development. Understandably, the 400 kilometer range claim is not fully verified; it is an estimate at best. Yet, the PL-17’s purpose is clear. Pakistan’s procurement of the PL-17 is quite clearly aimed towards India, whose air force has a slight numerical disadvantage in AWACS platforms. This disadvantage on India’s part combined with a seamless data link system used by Pakistan is generally accepted to be what caused India its humiliation in May 2025.
The PL-15 missiles deployed in that confrontation are also expected to be wielded by the PFX to no one’s surprise, and that is what makes the platform’s intended use as a deep strike platform abundantly clear. Further details remain secretive, but the PFX could potentially be used for similar air-to-ground combat operations, namely destruction/suppression of air defenses (DEAD/SEAD). Needless to say, this is a very ambitious project for the Pakistani military industrial complex to undertake.
That is where all the accessible details about the project end as other details remain secretive. From the basic desires attached to the project by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), we can deduce that they are looking for a versatile 4.5th generation jet with a lower price tag compared to the J-10CE that can also be deployed for deep strike missions. These are missions that the PAF cannot undertake using their capable F-16 Block 52 fleet due to usage restrictions. One may reliably assume that the unpleasant reality of such usage restrictions reared their ugly head for the PAF during confrontations in 2019 and 2025 quite boldly.
The ghosts that haunt the project
This would not count as Pakistan’s first foray into an independent project for a highly-capable fighter platform. The JF-17 itself could only be made possible by extensive contributions and leadership from the experienced Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), after PAF’s preceding ‘Project Sabre’ concept fell through. It would be more accurate to call the JF-17 an aircraft that the PAC developed in a joint venture with the CAC, with the latter gaining much in terms of return on investment.
Project AZM is the spookiest ghost that haunts the PFX concept. This was an overly-ambitious venture started in the early 2010s to develop a 5th-generation fighter platform or something very close to it. Lofty goals such as an internal weapons bay and stealth-shaping aside, AZM was also intended to drive Pakistan’s domestic military-industrial complex surrounding aeronautics and avionics.
Of course, the hype didn’t last long as the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex soon found out exactly what it takes to mold such a project, or even a project close to it. AZM’s core teams numbered in the low hundreds, whereas successful comparable programs abroad run with thousands of engineers and deep specialist supply chains. Pakistan was requested to join Turkish Aerospace’s KAAN program from the beginning, and they employed between 6,000 and 7,000 personnel to bring its next-generation fighter aircraft project to the flying prototype stage. This is a stark mismatch for a program that requires advanced aero-structures, stealth materials, high-performance engines, and sensor fusion expertise. [Quwa]
The KAAN made its first flight on the 21st of February, 2024 [Reuters]. It has gone down in history as a critical step forward that the Pakistan Air Force has had to miss out on, as the KAAN was developed with the express intent of replacing the Turkish Air Force’s F-16 fleet. What motivated the development and induction of the KAAN? Turkiye’s expulsion from the F-35 program and usage restrictions on their F-16 fleet. The latter problem is something that Turkiye shares with Pakistan, even though Recep Tayyip Erdogan previously claimed that such restrictions are ‘not binding’. [Daily Sabah]
Pakistan has only recently joined the KAAN project in early 2025 in a limited capacity, with economic troubles plaguing the state. It will be a very long time until the Pakistan Air Force is able to field its own variant of the jet. Of course, a lack of political will combined with a lack of technical expertise led to the cancellation of Pakistan’s domestic foray for a symbol of military self-reliance. The bitterness of missing out on the early stage of the KAAN project, for whatever reason, stings with great intensity.
With Pakistan in 2025 existing in an economic state of being vastly inferior compared to where it was during the development of Project AZM, can Pakistan Aeronautical Complex marshal the resources it needs to be able to achieve its indigenization goals for the PFX? There is no real reason to be so confident about it as of the time of writing.
Even then, baby steps towards something like that have already been taken with the JF-17 Block 3, as Pakistanis get used to the process of doing their own modifications on foreign tech. By building a new integration facility to oversee the integration of weapon and subsystem systems onto the JF-17, the PAF started to bridge this gap in 2020. Since then, the PAF has added a number of indigenously produced weapons to the Thunder, such as the AZB series of precision-guided bombs (PGB), and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) such as the Raad and anti-ship Taimur missiles.
Further iterations of the Taimur alongside Chinese C-802A and CM-400AKG can give the PFX a versatile maritime strike role if deployed for such roles. One may begin to speculate about whether a successful PFX project could also form the Pakistan Naval Air Arm’s first fleet of tactical strike fighters.
Compared to the Taimur though, the Raad missile has gone ahead further in terms of technological maturity. It is capable of being launched with a nuclear tip to fulfill an aerial nuclear strike delivery role. This was previously held by the PAF’s Mirage V fleet, and now the role has seemingly been passed on to the JF-17 carrying an air-launched variant of the Raad. [Federation of American Scientists]
A PFX with a more powerful engine compared to the Block 3 can potentially fulfill this role effectively as part of this Pakistani indigenization drive. Yet, there are serious issues on that front, too.
Fatal flaw
RD-93 engines are already used by the JF-17 Block 3. There are issues with this engine that the PAF cannot afford to attach to the new PFX. The primary issue is that the existing RD-93 supply chain that goes via China intended for the Block 3 may not be enough for the PFX to achieve the sort of deep strike capabilities that are desired. It would not offer the PAF any substantial performance upgrades in comparison. Furthermore, the PAF’s Indian adversary has the JF-17’s powerplant figured out.
Early October saw rumors of the MA variant of the RD-93 which offers increased thrust and other performance improvements over the baseline RD-93 supposedly being offered to Pakistan. The logical assumption was that these could have either been fitted to newer-production Block 3s, or a new upgrade altogether. This raised alarms in India, prompting Russia to deny any bilaterial agreement to supply the RD-93MA. Yet, Pyotr Topychkanov of the Primakov Institute, a Russian state-run think tank focusing on geopolitics went on to state quite interestingly, that India would ‘benefit’ from such a sale. [bdnews24]
He had to be pointing towards the fact that a Russian powerplant for new Pakistani jets would allow their Indian adversary to gain the intelligence edge. Of course, that is unacceptable for a PFX project intended to shoot Indian AWACS and tankers out of the sky. So what option is left? None. Dramatic effect aside, the RD-93 seemingly has to be used as an interim option until Chinese engines mature, or when and if the WS-10 engine can be properly co-opted for the PFX.
This is not ideal for the project, and it is a significant contributor to uncertainties regarding when the PFX may reach a flying prototype stage, along with all the other concerns regarding the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex’s technical capabilities in bringing the project to fruition on their own. That is, without having to rely too much on the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation or any other Chinese partner once again. The ghost of the failed AZM project haunts this project to that extent.
The issues surrounding the engine for the PFX thus stand as its fatal flaw currently. One would have to look out for indications to possible plans to simply scrap the project altogether and simply wait until a proper mainstay 5th generation fighter platform from China is fully made available to Pakistan. [Arab News]
Until such a platform enters regular PAF service, a new variant of the J-10 could also be the answer to PAF’s problem of not being able to target high value air targets. It is to be noted that the combined Rafale-BrahMos threat is what the PAF seeks to deter through a highly potent solution of their own through the PL-17 and similar air-to-ground cruise missiles.
Pakistan’s lack of strategic depth determined by its geography in relation to India is what drives such measures. Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft can place more Pakistani assets within their kill ranges using munitions with significantly lower ranges compared to the PL-17’s reported 400-kilometer range. Therefore, PAF aircraft must be able to outgun them to stand a chance at levelling the playing field. Further challenges from potential future upgrades to India’s AWACS and data-linking capabilities thus necessitate the ability to threaten them directly. The mere possibility of an AWACS aircraft being threatened is potent enough. They are immensely expensive platforms to procure, operate, maintain, and train personnel for.
Yet, if the enemy knows all that they need to know about the performance metrics of the engine, there are problems to be had for the side that has the disadvantage in strategic depth. It remains to be seen what the performance metrics of the PFX might be, and whether or not that breaks the feasibility of the project altogether. The PAF has already demonstrated the potency of a domestically developed data link system, but indigenous development of an AESA radar is a step too far as of the time of writing.
A lot of uncertainties therefore surround this project.
Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques A gradaute of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.