Typhoon – Big Promises, Big Challenges 

Since the 2010s, the Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) has consistently intended to acquire a modern multirole combat aircraft to serve as its long-term mainstay fighter. This need emerged as the operational limitations of older aircraft, such as the Chinese-produced J-7s and ageing Russian-produced MiG-29s, became increasingly incapable of fulfilling Bangladesh’s growing operational demands. As regional airpower became more advanced and the country’s maritime, territorial, and air-defence responsibilities expanded, these outdated models lacked the range, technology, and versatility required for the Bangladesh Air Force of the mid-21st century.

Within its national defence modernization framework known as Forces Goal 2030, the BAF officially stated the need for a multirole fighter capable of air defence, precision strike, maritime interception and reconnaissance, equipped with modern avionics, sensors, and weapons. Over the years, the Bangladesh Air Force explored multiple options through feasibility studies and supplier discussions with Russia, China, and assorted Western manufacturers.

However, procurement decisions were repeatedly influenced by budget constraints, concerns about technology transfer and maintenance, and geopolitical/political factors. As a result, the process advanced in stages rather than through a single rapid purchase, and each step involved a balance between cost, supply, security, and technical goals, balanced with the technical complexities that the BAF can handle. The recent signing of a Letter of Intent with Leonardo S.p.A, an Italian aerospace and defense company that represents the Eurofighter Typhoon consortium, marks an important development in the ongoing effort to replace older jets with a modern, future-oriented combat platform. The LOI was signed on the 9th of December 2025 at BAF Headquarters in Dhaka and includes plans for the future supply of Eurofighter Typhoon fighters to strengthen the Bangladesh Air Force. [Reuters]

A true group project in military aviation

The Eurofighter Typhoon is a modern twin-engine, supersonic multirole combat aircraft developed by a consortium involving BAE Systems (United Kingdom), Leonardo S.p.A (Italy), and Airbus (Germany & Spain). The Typhoon uses a canard-delta wing design and digital fly-by-wire (FBW) controls, along with advanced avionics, to provide high agility and strong performance for many types of missions. It can carry a wide range of weapons, including long-range air-to-air missiles and precision ground-attack weapons. Its modern radar and sensors allow it to detect and track multiple targets at long distances and operate effectively in complex, networked environments. Such capabilities place in the same operational category as its competitor, the Dassault Rafale, making for a true omni-role platform.

The jet is currently in service with about ten operators, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey. More than 750 aircraft have been ordered in total around the world, making it one of Europe’s most successful modern fighter programs, and a great example of a jointly-developed fighter platform.

This is not the first time countries have worked together on a fighter design. Such a project was the Panavia Tornado, developed jointly by the same set of entities; BAE Systems, Airbus, and Leonardo. The Tornado first flew in 1974 and entered service in 1979. Designed for the Cold War era, it was a multirole combat aircraft capable of low-level fast penetration strike missions. It was built in three primary configurations. These were: IDS (interdictor/strike), ECR (electronic combat and reconnaissance), and ADV (air defense variant).

Throughout its operational history, the Tornado served as a frontline aircraft for four air forces- the Royal Air Force (United Kingdom), the Luftwaffe (Germany), the Italian Air Force, and the Royal Saudi Air Force. It saw extensive action in major conflicts such as the Gulf War, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. Its combat record in these deployments had been judged to be successful.

Indeed, the Tornado’s success as a multinational European project paved the way for later collaborations on combat aircraft like the Eurofighter. It proved that sharing design responsibilities, development costs, and industrial effort across allied states can produce powerful and effective weapons systems together.

The idea of the Eurofighter Typhoon originated from a shared need in the late 1970s and early 1980s for a highly agile fighter to counter advanced Soviet aircraft like the MiG‑29 and Su‑27. This was done in a short period of reduced US defense spending, and the need to have platforms that could be maintained without having to rely on the US. In 1979, the UK issued Air Staff Target (AST) 403, prompting British Aerospace to propose the P.110 concept. This later became the Experimental Aircraft Programme (EAP), a privately funded technology demonstrator that first flew in 1986. The EAP introduced advanced features such as canard wings fly‑by‑wire controls, and composite materials.

In 1983, the UK, West Germany, Italy, Spain, and France launched the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) program to share resources for a next-generation fighter. However, disagreements over design and industrial roles caused delays, and France withdrew in 1985 to work on what would later become the Rafale. The remaining countries formed Eurofighter GmbH and Eurojet Turbo GmbH in 1986 to manage the aircraft and its EJ200 engines.

The EF2000 prototype, based on EAP technology, made its first flight on 27 March 1994. Despite the end of the Cold War and budget challenges, the program continued to ensure Europe’s defense independence. In September 1998, the aircraft was officially named “Typhoon”, but the naming process was controversial, with partner countries debating over alternatives before agreeing on the name. Production contracts were signed in the same year, and the first operational Typhoons entered service in August 2003, marking the result of decades of multinational cooperation and engineering innovation. [BBC]

There are several production variants of the Eurofighter Typhoon, known as tranches, each introducing new capabilities and upgrades. Tranche  2, delivered from the mid-2000s onwards, featured upgraded mission computers and compatibility with advanced weapons like Meteor and Storm Shadow. Tranche  3, approved under the 3A contract in 2009, included structural modifications to support conformal fuel tanks, enhanced electronics for future systems, and AESA radar readiness, meaning the aircraft was prepared for future integration of advanced electronically scanned array radar depending on the needs and capabilities of operators. [Army Recognition]

The initial aircraft deliveries started in March 2014. Tranche 4 is a significant upgrade over Tranche 3A, incorporating advanced systems to ensure the Eurofighter Typhoon remains technologically competitive for decades. It features the Captor‑E Mk1 AESA radar, improved avionics for enhanced weapon compatibility, and electronic warfare enhancements. Tranche 4 is expected to carry the Typhoon platform to a service life well beyond 2060.

The quest for a mainstay multirole fighter 

From the early 2010s through mid-decade, BAF continued operating an aging fighter fleet built around legacy Chengdu J-7 fighters and a small number of MiG-29s. During this period, the focus was largely on sustaining existing aircraft and acquiring modern trainers rather than signing contracts for new high-end multirole combat aircraft. This reflected Bangladesh’s measured approach to upgrading capabilities while managing fiscal and strategic complications. 

In March 2010, during the annual WINTEX‑2010 exercises at the Kurmitola Air Base, a comprehensive defense procurement plan for the Bangladesh Air Force was announced. The initiative set in motion acquisitions of fighter aircraft, surface‑to‑air missile systems, helicopters, air‑defence radars, and other armaments to modernize the force. [The Daily Star] 

A Russian military news report from December 1, 2010, indicated that Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Group was in preliminary talks with the Bangladesh Air Force regarding possible sales of JF‑17 and J‑10 fighters. However, no concrete agreement had materialized by mid‑2012. Analysts at the time noted that political factors could have heavily influenced such decisions, with potential deals often contingent on the ruling party, highlighting the strategic and confidential nature of advanced defence acquisitions during that period. 

During the 2015-2016 period, the then Air Chief Marshal Abu Esrar directed the Bangladesh Air Force to evaluate the Eurofighter Typhoon. In July 2016, he had the opportunity to thoroughly assess the Eurofighter Typhoon with key BAF personnel while at the Farnborough International Air Show. Interest in the Typhoon emerged from an understanding that it was time to switch focus away from Chinese and Russian platforms. The emerging Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and the fact that both China and Russia exercised veto powers in favor of Myanmar during that period raised concerns. [Dhaka Tribune] 

In 2017, the government issued a formal tender for eight multirole combat aircraft in an effort to move beyond legacy jet types toward more capable platforms. However, this tender did not immediately yield a signed contract, highlighting both the complexity of such procurements and the careful assessment the government pursued over the coming years. As a response to the tender during the period from 2017 to 2020, there were talks about the possibility of a purchase package that included both the Sukhoi Su-30SME and the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-35. The latter is a further development of the MiG-29 design, which the BAF already operated, making for a viable deal on the surface. Ultimately, the deal was not progressed in any meaningful manner, and a contract was not finalized. The fact that the Tatmadaw – Lay (Myanmar Air Force) already operated the Su-30SME may have played a role in the decision to discard the idea. 

By the early 2020s, discussions continued occasionally about options for modern fighters from various countries, including potential Western and Eastern suppliers. Media and defense analyses referenced ongoing interest and planning, but no confirmed purchase contracts were signed during this period as Bangladesh continued evaluating aircraft types, strategic needs, and geopolitical considerations. 

A major development occurred in October 2025, when the Government of Bangladesh publicly announced a plan to procure 20 Chinese Chengdu J-10CE multirole fighter jets- advanced 4.5-generation combat aircraft intended to significantly enhance BAF’s frontline capabilities. This initiative to modernize the Air Force with J-10CE jets, including aircraft, associated training, maintenance, and support, is estimated at about USD 2.2 billion (around Tk27,060 crore), with deliveries expected by around 2027 and payments to be spread over the next decade. This plan could be finalized through a direct purchase or a government-to-government (G2G) arrangement with China, reflecting decades of defense cooperation and recent strategic planning. [The Business Standard] 

Shortly after this milestone, on 9 December 2025, the BAF signed a Letter of Intent with Italy’s Leonardo S.p.A. for the future procurement of Eurofighter Typhoon multirole combat aircraft, representing a formal first step toward integrating Western-built fighter jets into BAF’s inventory. While an LOI is not a final contract and the number of jets and terms remain to be negotiated, it marks a significant broadening of procurement engagement and signals Bangladesh’s intent to diversify its sources of advanced fighters. [Reuters] 

Taken together, these developments show a clear trajectory that Bangladesh has moved from merely sustaining older fighter types toward serious and documented efforts to secure modern multirole combat aircraft, including advanced 4.5-generation platforms from both China and Europe. Both deals are currently in the midst of being processed. As of the time of writing, there is a lack of clarity regarding whether the BAF will end up operating only the J-10 or the Typhoon, or both. 

Given below is a table summarizing significant developments up to this point: 

Year	Development	Outcome
2010-13	Continued operation and delivery of legacy platforms.	Eurofighter Typhoon was evaluated for the first time at the Farnborough International Air Show 2016.
2016	Tender process initiated, but no contract finalized.	Firm inclusion of the Eurofighter Typhoon into the decision-making flow.
2017	Tender for 8 multirole combat aircraft issued	Tender process initiated, but no contract finalized.
2021-24	Maintained legacy fighter capability, but no new high-end jets yet.	An early step toward acquiring Western advanced fighters.
Oct 2025	Plans announced to purchase 20 Chinese J-10CE multirole fighters (US$2.2 billion)	A potential deal with training and logistics, delivery by 2027 is the target.
Dec 2025	Letter of Intent (LOI) signed with Leonardo S.p.A for Eurofighter Typhoon fighters	Early step toward acquiring Western advanced fighters.

Great choice on the surface 

Theoretically, the Typhoon Tranche 4 is an excellent choice for the Bangladesh Air Force. By itself, the platform would transform the BAF into a force capable of much more than simply air defense and interception duties. The capabilities offered by the Typhoon, if utilized properly with advanced C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) integrating air defense systems, will make it possible for the BAF to gain new capabilities it scarcely maintained in the past. These capabilities include: 

i) Terrestrial & maritime interdiction: 

Through the Typhoon, the BAF will gain advanced interdiction capabilities, being able to target enemy bases, ammunition dumps, and logistics hubs. Formations can also be configured to run SEAD/DEAD missions targeting enemy air defenses and supporting radar systems. True interdiction capabilities translate to being able to launch decisive strikes on enemy positions and assets vital to operational success. Indeed, Typhoons based inland are also capable of carrying out interdiction strikes at sea against enemy naval targets.

The full weapons suite that the Typhoon Tranche 4 is capable of utilizing a whole host of cutting-edge weapons systems dedicated to attacking surface targets. Chief among them are the Storm Shadow and Brimstone. Both of these missiles are capable of targeting targets on land and on the sea surface. The Brimstone in particular has been designed to effectively target and track mobile armored vehicles. Launched from fixed-wing aircraft, the missile has an effective range of around 60 kilometers.

The Storm Shadow on the other hand, being a cruise missile, has a range figure starting from 280 kilometers to up to 560 kilometers, depending on the missile variant and the platform it is being fired from. Marte ER missiles, specifically designed for maritime strike missions, serve similar roles at sea, capable of posing a serious threat to most kinds of naval vessels unprotected by accompanying aviation or air defense solutions.

It is difficult to underestimate how greatly the Storm Shadow alone can flip the strategic scenario between Bangladesh, India, and Myanmar. Being able to strike targets cross-border from central Bangladesh will create a new threat dimension for those who would rather not wish for the Bangladesh Air Force to gain new and advanced combat aircraft

ii) Enhanced punitive strike capabilities:

The capability to launch punitive strikes has emerged in recent times as a critical component of limited power projection and ‘sending a message’ so to speak. The idea of a punitive strike involves rapidly conducted, unannounced airstrikes on targets in the midst of steadily rising hostilities with the goal of purposeful escalation. Other motivations for punitive strikes include the rapid destruction of non-state actor infrastructure (camps and ammo dumps). Of course, such strikes are conducted outside of the purview and conventions of international law. Despite that, the very fact of the existence of the capability itself will provide deterrent value.

Punitive strike capabilities can be exercised through the aforementioned Storm Shadow air-to-ground missiles to great effect. If Bangladesh is ever challenged by non-state actors operating transnationally, this capability will give Bangladesh the necessary bargaining chips and the ability to exert overwhelming pressure on such adversaries. More importantly, the fact that Storm Shadow missiles can be launched effectively from well within home territory is an advantage that would shift the odds greatly in Bangladesh’s favor in the case of any confrontations.

Paveway IV guided bombs also accentuate these capabilities. With selective fusing options, payloads consisting of Paveways can be scaled according to the very minute requirements for measured strikes. Other variants of the Paveway series are capable of being deployed for varying uses depending on the type of target and the degree of deterrence required.

iii) Effective close air support:

Close air support capabilities have emerged as a crucial capability in any sort of combined arms deployment since the 1980s and 1990s. On-demand or near on-demand fire support by ground forces so that heavy enemy resistance in the form of armor or heavy machine gun nests can be defeated quickly holds the key to success or failure. Undoubtedly, this also translates to lives lost or saved among friendly forces.

Typhoon’s CAS contribution is anchored in its ability to employ modern precision-guided munitions. Weapons such as Paveway IV allow highly accurate strikes with selectable fusing, enabling engagement of targets in close proximity to friendly forces while minimizing collateral damage. The aircraft’s ability to carry and employ Brimstone missiles further expands its CAS utility, particularly against mobile or time-sensitive targets such as vehicles or fortified firing positions. Brimstone’s guidance modes and low-collateral profile permit stand-off engagements without requiring the aircraft to descend into low-altitude threat envelopes, which is especially relevant in environments where MANPADS and light air defenses may be present.

Advanced targeting and sensor integration further enhance Typhoon’s suitability for controlled CAS. Modern targeting pods provide high-resolution electro-optical and infrared imagery, laser designation, and battle damage assessment capability, allowing positive target identification and post-strike verification. Combined with Typhoon’s sensor fusion, these systems reduce pilot workload and support informed decision-making in dynamic CAS scenarios. This capability is critical for Bangladesh, where avoiding friendly fire and unintended damage carries significant political and strategic weight.

iv) Beyond visual range air combat:

Regular deployment of the Typhoon by the Bangladesh Air Force is to be logically expected to upset the diplomatic and military balance of power between Bangladesh and its neighbors as explained in the case of the Storm Shadow air-to-surface cruise missile. What would also drag the needle along significantly is the Meteor beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile. The Meteor is powered by a ramjet engine, which draws in air from the atmosphere to burn its in-built fuel stock for greater distances. This is opposed to the BAF’s previous experience with the R-27 and R-77 BVRAAMs, which are solid fuel rockets with their own stores of oxygen for the combustion process.

The difference is significant, with effective ramjet designs achieving significantly more range and speed compared to traditional solid-fuel rocket engines for missiles. In practice, this advantage provides the Meteor with its most valuable capacity; a greater no-escape zone (NEZ). Sustained maneuverability and speed leading up to the target make it significantly more difficult for a target to survive an encounter with a Meteor. This is despite the fact that the missile’s maximum range is closely comparable with those of its competitors.

In air-to-air combat, this is what serves to make even 10 to 16 Typhoons a formidable fleet as opponents. The Meteor’s advantages give the BAF the ability to overcome a key limitation that is expected to follow it into the foreseeable future; the inability to field sizeable fleets of combat aircraft. It also goes without saying that the BAF would also gain the ability to impose deterrence, acting on its own agency when flying combat air patrol missions.

Rapid advances in gaining these capabilities would be enough to provide Bangladesh with significant amounts of diplomatic capital to sway around to its advantage. would grant Bangladesh a qualitative geopolitical edge by reshaping regional threat perceptions rather than by enabling overt military dominance. Against both Myanmar and India, the Typhoon’s value lies in its ability to alter cost-benefit calculations at the planning level. As a highly capable, Western-origin multirole fighter with advanced sensors and long-range air-to-air weapons, its presence would signal that Bangladesh is no longer operating at the lower end of the regional airpower spectrum. This elevates Bangladesh from a reactive air defense posture to one capable of credible airspace denial and selective escalation control.

Vis-à-vis Myanmar, the Typhoon would create a clear asymmetry in capability. Myanmar’s air force relies primarily on legacy platforms with limited sensor fusion, weaker electronic warfare resilience, and inferior beyond-visual-range engagement potential. The Typhoon’s performance in interception, BVR combat, and precision strike would significantly constrain Myanmar’s freedom of action near the border and in adjacent airspace. Even a small Typhoon fleet would complicate any attempt by Myanmar to use airpower coercively, as planners would have to assume rapid detection, engagement at extended ranges, and a high probability of attrition. This would act as a stabilizing deterrent by raising the risks of escalation beyond what Naypyidaw could comfortably absorb.

The Typhoon also enhances Bangladesh’s diplomatic positioning by embedding it more deeply into the Western defense ecosystem without formal alliance commitments. Operating a frontline European fighter implies long-term political engagement with multiple major European states, creating external stakeholders in Bangladesh’s security and stability. This complicates any adversary’s calculus by internationalizing the consequences of pressure or escalation against Bangladesh. The aircraft thus functions as a form of indirect strategic insurance, where deterrence is reinforced by political relationships as much as by combat capability.

Serious complexities to manage 

The purchase of the Typhoon will be a first for the Bangladesh Air Force. More precisely, it will be the first time that the BAF is set to operate a modern Western combat aircraft platform as a non-NATO operator. It will be a break in the BAF’s continuous history of operating Chinese and Russian platforms as mainstay combat platforms. The BAF is aiming for a configuration comparable to the Tranche 4, potentially leaving space for further upgrades to last the platform for a very long period of time.

Bringing this platform into regular service will require a sustained commitment from the BAF to outlast subsequent elected governments. The switch to NATO-standard avionics, weapons systems, operating procedures, and inventory management is expected to require extensive re-education of ground crew, engineers, and traffic controllers. This is without mentioning the fact that servicemen chosen to be Typhoon pilots would have to undergo rigorous training.

Training for any new aircraft, J-10 and JF-17 included, will necessarily include long sessions in full fidelity simulators alongside direct on-site training, typically in the territory of the supplier. In the case of the Typhoon, that would be Italy, United Kingdom, or Germany; or potentially all three. To make sure that the Bangladesh Air Force can properly sustain itself and its Typhoon fleet, a selected few must undergo ‘train the trainer’ programs. These pilots would then be able to train new pilots through two-seat training variants within Bangladesh.

The same, of course, goes for ground crews who would be responsible for maintenance, timely arming/re-arming, and refueling. For any aircraft, a highly-trained, disciplined, and well-drilled ground crew is non-negotiable if constant airworthiness is desired. Initial courses and training programs intended to instil familiarity with the platform and its support requirements would require large numbers of crewmen to be trained in Italy or the United Kingdom. Both pilot training and ground crew training are processes that should be expected to take multiple years to fully complete to an operational level.

Key questions naturally arise regarding maintenance. It is known that the Bangladesh Air Force has had to send legacy platforms off to Russia or China for overhauling and maintenance of key components, such as the engines themselves. Naturally, the inability to achieve self-reliance in necessary maintenance programs degrades the combat readiness of the Bangladesh Air Force at any given time. The Typhoon is a far more advanced platform with a significantly more complex, although simplified by design EJ200 jet engine developed by Rolls Royce. The EJ200 is composed of specially developed composite materials, fully integrated digital control mechanisms, and a bladed disk design for its exhaust fan. Maintaining a fleet of 16 Typhoons as per reports, with two EJ200s each, will require gargantuan effort to bring the capabilities of ground crewmen fully up to speed.

One may not expect the Bangladesh Air Force to be able to work on and maintain the EJ200 in-house in Dhaka or any other maintenance point within Bangladesh right away or in the near-term after induction. If that is to be the case for how the Typhoon will be operated, it will raise a few eyebrows, to say the least. If the BAF’s mainstay fighter jet has to be hauled off to the United Kingdom and Germany for maintenance and overhauling, then there would be serious gaps in defense readiness at a time when Bangladesh is on a precarious track diplomatically on all sides.

Typhoons in Europe and the Gulf Cooperation Council states are assisted by Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) frameworks and organized international logistic arrangements. Saudi Arabia has arranged workforce localization for maintenance through the Salam Support Solution partnership with BAE Systems, which creates the environment for knowledge transfer. For certain specialized repairs and maintenance operations, local entities have emerged as more than capable. Building or collaborating for MRO capabilities or paying for prolonged contractor assistance from Europe will be necessary to replicate a similar ecosystem outside of an integrated domain like NATO or even the GCC, although those states are yet to have an integrated military domain. Bangladesh is not in a position to benefit from any of these due to geographical distance and non-membership in NATO. It remains to be seen how the Bangladesh Air Force decides to tackle this issue, with a view towards ensuring proper readiness.

When it comes to weapons and avionics, there are further complexities to manage. Ineffective management or a lack of commitment following a capability assessment will be grounds for the deal to be derailed. With the Typhoon representing the cutting edge of pan-European military technology, the platform’s weapons and avionics are subject to tight European Union export controls. The integration of weapons systems such as the Meteor air-to-air missile and the Brimstone air-to-ground guided missile, both quite advanced, will require separate purchase agreements drawing from separate supply chains. This is indeed also the case with other constant consumables such as bombs, flares, electronic counter measures (ECMs), and ammunition for the Mauser BK-27 cannon firing 27mm rounds.

The logistics of weapon systems, such as radar and avionics spare parts and components, usually have lengthy lead times. It will be necessary for operators without any prior experience with Western fighters, such as Bangladesh, to prepare for stock holdings and potentially negotiate contractor-managed spare pools or performance-based logistics. On top of all this, the BAF must find a way to seamlessly manage the existence of different primary suppliers (BAE Systems and Airbus). Comprehensive agreements instead of separate, disjointed agreements would go a long way towards reducing headaches, barring complications that may be raised by government parties enforcing export controls.

Serious questions also arise regarding maintenance capacity and the streamlining of logistics if the Typhoon is to be operated alongside the J-10CE. The fundamental issue is that putting both into operational service will mean distinct Chinese and Western tracks, translating to distinct standards for inventory management and regular operational activities.

The BAF will be left to manage separate supply chains from entirely different parts of the world. When combined with incompatible diagnostic instruments, different quality standards, different support regimes, and disparate technical support procedures. Managing all of this effectively would be a logistics nightmare, to say the least. And this is without going into the training of pilots and crews. Both platforms may also require different-sized configurations for hangars, which would have to be managed.

Both would have to be trained under separate programs, and a crewmember trained for one cannot be expected to work on the other. Extending it to simulators and supporting training systems, the process becomes significantly more costly and complicated. The issue of creating a working data-link system capable of formulating a kill chain also remains a question. This issue is not unique to the dual deployment of both J-10s and Typhoons, however, as the earlier announcement for the J-10CE raised eyebrows pertaining to whether or not the BAF would be able to deploy a robust data-link system integrating air defenses and combat platforms. The complexity increases further when two separate air combat platforms are being fielded. It is not theoretically impossible to manage both the J-10CE and the Typhoon together, yet the question of whether the BAF can successfully do it for a long time is an important one.

An issue haunting the deployment of both the J-10 and the Typhoon in isolation, let alone together, is the fact that the BAF is yet to develop an advanced data-link system that creates the grounds for a seamless kill-chain link. The Pakistan Air Force’s response to Operation Sindoor has proven the importance of the ability to be the first to identify targets using ISR or air defense platforms and track targets and then seamlessly feed that information to combat aircraft. There is a significant amount of work for Bangladesh to do on that front, and the work must be done sooner rather than later to be ready by the time that new aircraft are fully ready for induction.

The Typhoon alone will be a significant financial trial for the Bangladesh Air Force and the government. This cost will be borne by future elected governments of Bangladesh, and not the current interim government led by Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus. This is because the BAF will not be fully ready to field the platform with a full package of sensors, weapons, and training for at least a few years.

Finally, a guarantee from suppliers that combat use of the platform would not be restricted in any case due to geopolitical tension is yet to come. This is the issue faced by the Pakistan Air Force’s F-16s. Their combat deployment is regulated by the United States based on its own calculations and considerations. Whether or not the United Kingdom and Germany, or any of its European Union partners, would call for similar controls upon the BAF’s operation of the Typhoon is a burning question.

Essential value of the Typhoon for the BAF is to be found as a motivator of institutional & technological reform. It has to be, otherwise a lot of money will be burnt for little return.

Verification Note: Information is sourced from and corroborated from various news sources, documents, and government archives. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.