Four years after taking over Afghanistan for the second time since 1996, the Taliban are attempting to organize their home front. The group has had a very difficult time consolidating itself and dealing with external issues. Oversimplified narratives do little to improve our understanding of the dynamics at play, and they do not serve anyone in any meaningful capacity. The Taliban’s geopolitical direction may also seem rather haphazard and incoherent a lot of the time. But why is that? And how would one contextualize such a thing within recent events surrounding armed combat between Afghanistan and the Taliban? This article serves as a guide for any prospective observer attempting to understand Afghanistan.
Understanding the Taliban structurally
The Taliban exists, but there is no such thing as the ‘Taliban’. What does this paradoxical statement mean exactly? It means that there is no unified entity that can be called the ‘Taliban’. It is not a political party per se; rather it is a holistic movement. A common basic ideological consensus of what Afghanistan should be and how it ought to be governed is what brings the participants of the ‘Taliban’ together.
It does not have a unified structure in the slightest sense of the word. It is better viewed as a coalition of semi-autonomous networks that are united by a common ideology and wartime unity but split by institutional, regional, and tribal allegiances as well as by radically different outlooks on Afghanistan’s future. This is even though all of its participants agree upon a common Islamist vision for Afghanistan guided by Deobandi principles. Apart from the fact that the country is of multi-ethnic makeup, its difficult geography has often been the one to claim the end of movements attempting to impose a sweeping unitary identity for all populations within. Examples of such include various liberal nationalist and socialist movements that have tried to transform a feudal Afghanistan to their liking. [Open Edition Journals, Adam Pain]
Islam has only been the consistently strong unifying factor that has been successful in galvanizing popular ‘national’ consensus. Of course, it is the Taliban that has been the standard bearer for that, but even that does not guarantee full consensus. Yet again, the country’s vast complexities throw the figurative monkey wrench in the works, complicating attempts to truly unify the country.
Drawing from various sources, given below are the internal factions within the Taliban that are in play:
A) Kandahar Core/Rahbari Shura: This consists of the power structure centered around the ulema based within the historic city of Kandahar. These men form the clerical core of the Taliban, being responsible for its overall ideological direction. They are the faction in power, rallying around Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada. This faction maintains a strict chokehold over religious police units and the judiciary, and is heavily composed of loyal ethnic Pashtuns from the south of the country. Indeed, Akhundzada himself is from that part of Afghanistan, and more specifically, Kandahar province. This ideological core has existed since the times of Mullah Omar and the first generation of Taliban leaders. They are known to be the source of all the headline-grabbing hardline Islamist policies and actions, including isolationism. [Brookings Institution]
B) Haqqani Network: This family enterprise has been active as heavy-hitting militants since the 1970s, opposing the nationalist Mohammad Daoud Khan regime and then the Soviet invasion. It is centered around the Haqqani family, initially led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, and they had gained significant experience in special warfare and intelligence over the course of five decades. Since the 1990s, they have been attached to the Taliban, and both Jalaluddin Haqqani and Sirajuddin Haqqani have been appointed key ministerial positions in successive Taliban governments. Indeed, the Haqqanis are known to be in control of much of the current Islamic Emirate’s intelligence and special forces apparatus, and they also have maintained ties with foreign intelligence agencies. They are aligned with Kandahar as far as a shared Islamist vision is concerned, but are comparatively pragmatic enough to be able to steer Afghan foreign policy in a different direction. Between themselves and Kandahar, different visions for how the country ought to be governed are likely to exist as well. Their support base is primarily concentrated in the Paktia province, significant parts of Kabul province, and Khost province bordering Pakistan. [European Foundation for South Asian Studies, RFL/RFE]
C) Technocrats/Moderates: A significant portion of Taliban bigwigs prefer measured moderation and liberalization. This faction of the Taliban is based around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it would appear that they diverged enough from the Kandahar clerical core due to demonstrated successes in maintaining a lifeline for the Taliban as a whole through Qatar during the insurgency phase. It was previously led by Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, who, it must be noted, was educated at the Army Cadet College in Nowgaon and the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun before being commissioned in the Afghan Army of the Soviet-backed communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [ThePrint]. His inclusion in the Taliban was backed by his decision to defect and fight the Soviets in the mid-1980s. Regardless, Stanikzai emerged as a powerful moderate figure and loud critic of Akhundzada in early 2025, criticizing him for the decision to ban women’s education. For this, he was forced to flee to the United Arab Emirates, and charges brought against him are presumably intended to force the entire moderate faction to quiet down. Hopes for this faction currently rest on Taliban old-timer Abdul Gani, who appears to understand the need to engage more with Western powers. He was the one to sign the 2020 Doha Agreement with Donald Trump, and was historically considered to be a moderate, but not by much. [Afghanistan International, The New York Times]
The remaining are relatively minor factions in terms of decision-making that affect Afghanistan’s international relations, but they are often nonetheless powerful interlocutors whose actions and desires often influence foreign relations. They are to be looked out for in the future.
D) Gen Z Taliban: New generation and mid-level Taliban officials who are versed in communicating internationally and employing technology for their purposes. While still steadfastly Islamist based on the principles of Taliban, it is generally understood that this cohort would prefer a Taliban that participates in the global geopolitical playground far more actively. It is important to note that this ‘faction’ has not yet assumed an organized form, but that a general ‘Gen Z’ cohort remains visible within the Taliban whose ideas predictably differ from those of older generations in leadership. They prefer gradual professionalization of bureaucratic and economic structures, and are known to value accelerated economic development. It is highly likely that this Gen Z cohort has been the driving force behind cryptocurrency use and adoption despite an ostensible ban. How this cohort ends up influencing the Taliban’s finance policies in the future is bound to be of geopolitical interest due to their willingness to try new avenues. [Binance]
E) Feudal/Tribal Heads: Regional tribal/political leaders and commanders of regional militias dot the interior of Afghanistan. Ethnic minority groups such as the Hazaras and certain Tajik tribes also fall within this category. This is a direct result of the country’s geographical makeup, with the central government having forever been next to invisible in many parts of the country, regardless of regime. The former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan attempted to exert and maintain control through informal alliances with regional warlords who had become powerful in the wake of the turbulent 1990s, and through favorable financial deals. The Taliban finds itself in a similar dilemma with them, and has since attempted to rein them in through the application of Islamic law, and certain concessions regarding how they make their income. Some of these income streams are linked to transnational smuggling operations and have stood in the way of Afghanistan shedding its tertiary reputation as a narco-state. Something like that ultimately harms its diplomatic prospects. [Taylor & Francis, Hamid Azizi]
This is the structure that the Taliban has to work with before even considering where to take the country internationally. There are simply way too many complexities to work through. This is where it is necessary to examine the Taliban’s immediate geopolitical goals, especially in a time when too many things are going on at the same time.
Immediate geopolitical goals
Taliban leaders are attempting to balance a tightrope between avoiding too much liberalization and total diplomatic isolation. The reasons for the former surround maintaining the support of significant parts of its own population, which tolerate and participate in the Taliban for the express desire of wishing to see a far-right conservative Islamist power sitting in Kabul that works overtime to keep ‘foreign influences’ from outside the country. A special consideration in the case of the Pashtun population is also involved here, which desires, over the long term, the development of a common consciousness amongst Pashtuns in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Undoubtedly, this has been a key source of hostility between itself and Pakistan.
As for avoiding total diplomatic isolation, it is understood by the current generation of Taliban leaders that this was what caused the first Taliban government led by Mullah Omar to collapse, as its extreme isolationism prevented it from building geopolitical capital and using it to present its case to the world. Without it, there was no one to oppose the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan. Taliban leaders in 2025 want to make sure that it has a stake in the international political playground without being blinded by achieving dominance at home.
Thus, the Taliban’s goals can be understood in the following terms:
A) Diplomatic legitimacy and economic stabilization: Critical sectors of the Afghan economy and public infrastructure have historically been dependent on foreign aid during the Republican era. Due to the Taliban never mincing words regarding their far-right Islamist vision for Afghanistan, there has been a brain drain taking effect in the country since 2021. There are few experienced professionals left to manage those sectors, especially the health sector. Taliban leadership has had as its priority the inclusion of new expertise and personnel who can help get those sectors up and running again. The gradual rise of a new ‘business class’ within the country is tied to this, and the need to develop a formalized economic structure to go along with achieving diplomatic legitimacy. China and India have emerged as key lifelines for such plans. [Reuters]
B) Establishing internal monopoly on violence: The Taliban is embattled by forces such as the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) and pre-existing problems regarding the extent of its control over feudal warlords, tribal heads, and regions populated by minority ethnic groups. ISKP is opposed to the Taliban on a fundamental level in terms of doctrine and schools of thought. It has become a rallying banner for disaffected youths, families who were treated harshly by the Taliban, and select ethnic minority populations. Apart from this, previous successes in curtailing the out-of-control drug trade require further consolidation and overwatch. There is more work to be done, and further safeguards against its resurgence must be placed. [Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime]
C) Maintaining full sovereignty: This regime fought its way to power in Kabul on a mandate of a very strict desire for independence. This was galvanized within the context of constant foreign meddling and domination in Afghanistan by outside powers. Such a historical context is what the entire Taliban and the majority of the current civilian population of Afghanistan have grown up with. Considering the fact that Donald Trump has stated that ‘very bad things will happen’ if the Bagram Airbase is not given up for US military use, the pressure is on to resist at all costs [Al Jazeera]. Leadership will have to be extra careful in navigating the global playing field, as being perceived as too close to any foreign power will risk self-portrayal as a puppet. Anxieties among the populace regarding foreign domination have had decades of relevance in their minds. [BAAG/ENNA]
D) Checkmating Pakistan: The Taliban’s most significant problem right now is neighboring Pakistan. A curse placed upon it by geography puts Afghanistan in a rock and hard place, all things considered. While the Taliban has historically been a key beneficiary of the foreign intelligence operations of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), perception is mixed due to feelings of Pashtun nationhood separated by borders. Much of the Taliban have historically resented the treatment of Afghan refugees who fled into Pakistan during various periods of unrest and war in the country and meddling by Pakistani intelligence agencies that often went too deep for comfort. The country is especially seen quite negatively by non-Pashtun ethnic groups, and their entry into the Taliban this time around was likely to have been a key factor in the current frosty relations. Moreover, lies the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a group which shares ideological, ethnic, and often familial kinship with the Afghan Taliban. Both are Deobandi-Sunni Islamist movements that reject Western-style democracy, celebrate the anti-US jihad era as a collective triumph, and seek to establish Islamic laws by violent jihad. Tribal, familial, or madrasa networks connect many senior commanders. Therefore, the TTP’s value as a vital armed ally and as a counterweight to a Pakistan increasingly seen as overbearing is critical. [CFR, UN Security Council report]
Problems surrounding these goals can be expected to last as a thorn in their side for the foreseeable future, with issues surrounding Pakistan currently being thrown into sixth gear. Unless a lasting ceasefire between Pakistan and Afghanistan is reached, a flashpoint may be reached in the near future.
An eventful period from August to October, and beyond
Things have been escalating rather rapidly for Afghanistan since August 2025 and since the flight of Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai. With the removal of such a heavyweight pushing for moderation, incoherence in Afghan foreign policy has become more apparent. The Taliban has been thrust into an eventful flashpoint, having to make hard decisions with little room for latitude.
Here is the month-by-month breakdown of what happened and what was done:
A) August 2025: A good start to the month for the Taliban came by way of diplomatic recognition from Russia. Shared concerns, such as the activities of ISKP, especially following the Crocus City Hall attack in 2024, brought Russia and Afghanistan close enough for this windfall to occur. Indeed, recognition by Russia has been used by Afghanistan to press further for legitimacy. Within Afghanistan, ISKP had been rather hard at work attempting to cause further destabilizing acts. One may begin to conjecture that, through this, it had become clearer to Taliban leadership that they must crack down harder on the ISKP if they are to form deeper diplomatic ties with Iran and Tajikistan. A high-level meeting that saw Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi personally visit Kabul on the 20th of August took place [PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. This visit was, however, part of a trilateral summit that included Pakistan, where China stressed to Afghanistan that security guarantees must be offered in exchange for economic aid and industrial development support. Of particular concern for China is the presence of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) militant group hiding out in Afghanistan. [East Asia Forum]
B) September 2025: ISKP attacks continued in Afghanistan over the course of Afghanistan, but the most notable highlight from September is the fact that the inconsistency of Afghan foreign policy had become apparent. The roots of course lie in the factional build-up of the Taliban itself. How was this made apparent? Significant diplomatic pressure was exerted upon Afghanistan in September by the United Nations Human Rights Council, with the backing of G7 states setting up a probe to monitor the state of women’s rights and safety under the rule of the Taliban, with only China abstaining. It would appear that the Kandahar-based hardliners got their way decisively with foreign policy responses to this event. The Taliban characterized external pressure as political meddling, publicly denied critiques, and restricted access to certain UN processes, such as the ongoing prohibitions on the UN special rapporteur and limits on UN investigators. [UN Human Rights Watch]
C) October 2025: With the beginning of October, India went ahead to restore high-level diplomatic relations with the Taliban-led Afghanistan short of full recognition. The Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, has made it clear that India sees the restoration of relations as a net positive for Afghanistan. “Closer cooperation between us contributes to your national development, as well as regional stability and resilience”, is what he told his Afghan counterpart Amir Khan Muttaqi [Associated Press]. Each such event of Afghanistan achieving greater diplomatic engagement signals to other parties that it might be possible to interact with the Taliban meaningfully. Not too long afterwards, Afghanistan’s troubles with Pakistan began with the airstrike on TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud in Kabul. The military confrontations since then have continued on and off between sustained episodes of ceasefires and negotiation attempts.
Forecasts for the coming few months surround what Afghanistan decides to do regarding the question of TTP and its relations with Pakistan.
The Taliban must make a difficult decision now that Pakistan has preconditioned the normalization of ties upon their cracking down on the TTP. While a firm crackdown on the TTP would appease Islamabad and lessen the likelihood of additional attacks, it would also infuriate local hardliners and make Pashtun-solidarity politics more difficult. Their internal preference was for controlled confinement and negotiation over the complete surrender of sanctuaries, but their external stance was dedication to the ceasefire and promises to deal with militants. However, Pakistan has stated in public that the truce will only last if Kabul does Afghanistan really stop the Taliban. Future ties between Kabul and Islamabad are defined by this tension. [Reuters]
There is a clear and present danger that agreeing to Pakistan’s demands too much would threaten internal cohesion amongst the Pashtun-majority Taliban. It must be remembered that the Afghan Taliban and the TTP are closely linked through familial and ideological ties. And ultimately, Afghanistan loses a critical and potent hedge against Pakistan. TTP also exists as an experienced core of fighters whom the Taliban would rather prefer to keep around.
The next few months of diplomatic and military chessboard moves between Pakistan and Afghanistan must be carefully noted.
Verification Note: Information sourced from and corroborated from government websites, documents, and news sources. Sources are carefully weighed for authenticity, and sources making superfluous claims without evidence are discarded. Information is then analyzed and interpreted to come to conclusions.
Fatin Anwar is an Associate Analyst at Bangladesh Defence Journal. He is responsible for in-depth research and analysis in combination with OSINT tools/techniques A gradaute of geography from the University of Dhaka, he had previously spent years working as a freelance writer specializing in research-heavy pieces related to geopolitics and military history.