Navigating Great Power Competition in the Indo-Pacific

In August 2024, Bangladesh underwent an historic political upheaval with the departure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in the face of a popular revolution led by students which brought her 16-year rule to an end. The consensus interim government which took power was immediately confronted with the daunting task of averting an economic crisis, restoring law and order, and undertaking critical political and economic reforms necessary to create conditions for free and fair elections. While the Hasina regime had become increasingly isolated, counting on neighboring India and autocratic regimes around the world for support, the interim government led by Nobel Laureate Professor Mohammad Yunus was widely welcomed by the international community. Now, five months after these historic events, Bangladesh has begun to look past the interim government to the return of an elected successor within the next 12 – 18 months.

Much has been written about the foreign policy challenges faced by the interim government, including managing the relationship with an India that has still not come to terms with the loss of its loyal client. There has also been a great deal of speculation in recent weeks about the impact of the U.S. election and how a second Trump Administration will engage with Bangladesh’s interim government. The purpose of this piece is to take a longer look at Bangladesh’s challenges in navigating Great Power competition in the Indo-Pacific. While this is not a new issue, the return of democratic government in Bangladesh provides an opportunity for the country to move past the transactional policies pursued by the Hasina regime.

Regardless of how long the interim government remains in power, and despite whatever progress it can achieve in addressing the legacy of the 16-year dictatorship, Bangladesh’s next elected government will need to focus primarily on domestic issues. The restructuring of Bangladesh’s economy, particularly addressing the chaos within the financial system after the extent of corruption in the banking sector, will be a long-term challenge. Other economic issues, to include employment creation, addressing inflation concerns, and providing a safety net for Bangladesh’s poorest citizens will no doubt be at the top of the next government’s agenda. The garment sector will continue to be the key pillar of Bangladesh’s exports, with attempts continuing to expand into other areas. Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves will also continue to rely on the remittances sent home by expatriate workers. After a decade plus fixation on large scale vanity infrastructure projects, the bills for which will be coming due, it is unlikely that the next government will have the luxury of pursuing similar projects. There will need to be conversations with Bangladesh’s creditors, including China and Russia, both to untangle corruption allegations and ensure the sustainability of debt service. The energy sector will be plagued by similar issues. Strong economic management will be critical to the next government’s success, and this will also require coordination between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as external partners play their traditional role in helping Bangladesh along the development path.

As the Hasina dictatorship lost legitimacy at home, holding a series of fraudulent elections, it was forced to seek legitimacy abroad. The Hasina government emphasized her connections to the Awami League’s patrons in New Delhi, Moscow, and Beijing, while seeking to score political points by “standing up” to Washington and others who emphasized the importance of human rights and democracy. The Hasina regime also sought to divide the traditionally like-minded partners by dangling commercial deals (Airbus with France) or threatening to move closer to Beijing (Japan and Australia). The Hasina regime’s foreign policy was not based on advancing Bangladesh’s interests, but rather in shoring up an undemocratic government and furthering the corrupt interests of the ruling oligarchy.

As her regime became increasingly desperate, Hasina and her cronies pretended that U.S. and Western interest in human rights was only a smokescreen for some outlandish “strategy” of acquiring military bases in Bangladesh. This both exaggerated Bangladesh’s strategic importance and mischaracterized the real value of Bangladesh’s armed forces in contributing to regional and global peace and security. The latter continues to be the result of Bangladesh’s admirable contribution to UN peacekeeping, particularly in Africa. While the Bangladesh Navy does play a role in enhancing maritime security in the Indian Ocean and other regions, it is at most a bit player in the Great Power naval competition. In many ways, Bangladesh’s singular importance is to provide a democratic alternative to the Chinese authoritarian model as the West tries to advance the idea of a free and open Indo Pacific. Thus, Bangladesh’s soft power is as important as its hard power.

With the aforementioned economic, political, and military considerations in mind, how they should Bangladesh navigate Great Power competition in the Indo Pacific going forward. First, Bangladesh should reconsider the rote formulation of “friendship towards all” that has guided past strategy. Bangladesh’s future strategy should be guided by its interests. These include seeking out and developing ties with those countries that serve as markets for Bangladesh’s exports, destinations for its expatriate workers, and partners in development and reform. As Bangladesh seeks to build its own democracy and unravel the legacy of its dictatorship, it will find a natural affinity with other democratic governments and democratic movements in those countries fighting their own tyrannies. On the security front, Bangladesh should continue to develop its peacekeeping capability while making smart investments in the defense sector based on the country’s legitimate security needs. As with the development sector, past investments in the security sector were often determined more by the opportunities for corruption during procurement rather than an analysis of what was most appropriate.

Bangladesh’s next government will face many challenges, on the domestic and international front. While that is the case, I remain optimistic about the country’s future. During the revolutionary summer of 2024, the Bangladeshi people showed that they were willing to make the ultimate sacrifice to control their destinies. With a popular mandate, the next government will be well positioned to address these challenges and chart a new course for the country. As they do so, they will find that Bangladesh has many friends and well-wishers around the world who will want to help them succeed in building a Golden Bengal.